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Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their 
antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. But they have also argued 
that the growth of large-scale enterprises operating in national and even international markets forced 
states to stop prosecuting monopolistic combinations out of fear of doing serious damage to their 
domestic economies. Our paper has revised this conventional view by focusing attention on the 
lawsuits that minority shareholders brought against their own companies in state courts of law and 
equity, especially suits that challenged the anticompetitive use of voting trusts. Historically judges 
had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had displayed a particular 
wariness of shareholders’ private actions. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had 
begun to revise their views and to see shareholders’ private actions as useful checks on economic 
concentration. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ 
activism shifted back and forth over time, the long-run effect was to make devices like voting trusts 
unsuitable for the purposes of economic concentration. 
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Voting Trusts and Antitrust:  Rethinking the Role of Shareholder Rights and 
Private Litigation in Public Regulation, 1880s to 1930s 
According to the conventional history of American antitrust policy, states took the lead in 
prosecuting monopolistic combinations in the late nineteenth century but then largely ceded the 
field to the federal government.  Before Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, a number of 
states had passed antitrust statutes, and their attorneys general actively deployed those laws 
against large-scale combinations.1 Those prosecutions usually succeeded because the states could 
draw as well on their power to charter corporations. Indeed, most state-level antimonopoly cases 
in the late nineteenth century were actually quo warranto suits.  Literally meaning “by what 
authority,” quo warranto proceedings allowed state courts to dissolve corporations that joined 
combines on the grounds that they had violated the terms of their state-granted charters.2  
Revocation of a corporation’s charter was, however, a drastic remedy that could hurt the 
economies of states that pursued it.  Especially after New Jersey liberalized its general 
incorporation law in 1888, consolidations could relocate their corporate homes to a friendlier 
jurisdiction, leading to the loss of tax revenues and perhaps also production facilities and jobs. 
As a consequence, once the federal government began to pursue a more active antitrust policy in 
the early twentieth century, state initiatives waned.3   
1 Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Jr., Trust and Corporation Problems (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1929), Ch. XVII. 
2 James May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual 
Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 135 (Mar. 1987): 495-593; May, 
“Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-
1918,” Ohio State Law Journal 50.2 (1989): 257-395; Paul Nolette, “Litigating the ‘Public Interest’ in the Gilded 
Age:  Common Law Business Regulation by Nineteenth-Century State Attorneys General,” Polity 44 (July 2012): 
373-399.
3 Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1955), 36-50, 235-368; Charles W. McCurdy, “The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the 
Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903,” Business History Review 53 (Autumn 1979): 304-42; 
     
That conventional history is fine as far as it goes, but, as we argue in this paper, it fails to 
capture some of the most distinctive features of the American regulatory system that emerged in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  Even as states abandoned their direct challenges 
to trusts, they continued to use their powers over corporations to enforce competition.  The 
difference was that the techniques they exploited were more subtle and relied to a much greater 
extent on litigation by private actors.  We are not referring here to private antitrust suits; these 
were certainly important, but their contribution is well known.4  Rather, we seek to focus 
attention on the lawsuits that shareholders brought against their own companies.  Derivative 
suits, for example, had emerged earlier in the century to provide minority investors in a 
corporation with a remedy against exploitative behavior by the majority in control.  Fearing that 
shareholders would exploit such suits opportunistically, judges had viewed them with suspicion 
and had erected substantial barriers to their success.  By the 1890s, however, judges who 
supported an antitrust agenda had come to realize that shareholders could be useful allies in the 
struggle against monopoly, and they took pains to help them shape these suits in ways that 
served competitive ends.   
Lawsuits involving voting trusts were a particularly important part of this story. Voting 
trusts were agreements by which stockholders transferred their shares in a corporation to one or 
more trustees who then voted them on the transferees’ behalf.5 Voting trusts could serve 
legitimate purposes. For example, they could be used to insure managerial stability or to induce 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), Ch. 6.
4 Private antitrust suits have attracted significant attention because their numbers soared after the Second 
World War.  See Steven C. Salop and Lawrence J. White, “Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation,” 
Georgetown Law Journal 74 (Apr. 1986): 1001-1064; Daniel A. Crane, Institutional Structure of Antitrust 
Enforcement (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2011), Ch. 3. 
5 For an overview of voting trusts and their uses, see Harry A. Cushing, Voting Trusts:  A Chapter in 
Modern Corporate History (New York:  Macmillan, 1927), Ch. 1. 
   
bankers to rescue a company in financial trouble.  By the late nineteenth century, however, it had 
become clear that they could also serve more nefarious purposes.  An investigation by the New 
York legislature in 1888 revealed that the Standard Oil Company and other large firms were 
using voting trusts to structure horizontal combinations.6  Although this use of the device faded 
after New Jersey’s liberalized general incorporation law made it possible for consolidations to 
reorganize as holding companies, a couple of decades later the U.S. Congress’s “Money Trust” 
hearings exposed the use of voting trusts by J. P. Morgan and allied bankers to control broad 
swaths of the American economy.7  Both revelations encouraged judges to rethink the legal rules 
governing voting trusts in ways that undermined their utility by ensuring that shareholders could 
withdraw from them at will. Ultimately, most state legislatures intervened by revising their 
statutes to permit voting trusts to be irrevocable for finite periods of time.  They thus restroed the 
device’s usefulness for purposes traditionally regarded as legitimate, at the same time as they 
prevented voting trusts from being used as tools of monopoly control. This combination of 
juridical rethinking and statutory revision, we suggest, helps to explain the waning power of 
finance capital in the American economy. 
Although we endeavor in this paper to broaden the understanding of the array of forces 
that states employed in service of antitrust policy, we also aim to contribute to the more general 
literature on American regulatory design, particularly the history of what political scientist Sean 
Farhang has called the “private enforcement regime.”8  Most scholars who write about “the 
6 New York, Report of the Committee on General Laws on the Investigation Relative to Trusts (Albany, 
New York:  Troy Press, 1888) 
7 See U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee Appointed … to Investigate the 
Concentration of Control of Money and Credit,” Report 1593, 62nd Cong., 3d Sess. (Washington:  Government 
Printing Office, 1913). 
8 Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2010).  See also David Freeman Engstrom, “Harvesting the Private Attorney General:  
Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation,” Columbia Law Review 112 (Oct. 2012): 1244-1325.  This literature focuses on 
the statutory provisions that empower private enforcement of the law in much the same way as the Sherman Act’s 
   
state” assess its performance through Weberian eyes and track its growth through the 
development of formal institutions that allowed officials to assert regulatory oversight over the 
economy.9  States began to build such institutions for antitrust purposes in the late nineteenth 
century, but they soon largely abandoned them in the face of economic pressures.  Rather than 
giving up on competition policy, however, they pursued it in more indirect ways, relying 
increasingly on private shareholders’ suits to achieve antitrust ends. These efforts have been 
largely invisible to scholars.  We thus offer this paper in the spirit of Brian Balogh’s A 
Government Out of Sight. Much of state competition policy in the early twentieth century was 
“hidden in plain sight,” but that did not make it any less important.10 
Nineteenth-Century Federalism and the Challenge of the Trusts 
Standard Oil sparked the antitrust movement when it embarked in the 1870s on an 
ambitious campaign to dominate the petroleum industry, making novel use of voting trust 
agreements to evade the restrictions on mergers imposed by state law.11  Standard was an Ohio 
corporation and Ohio law, like that of other states at the time, prohibited corporations from 
holding stock in other companies. Standard could take over refineries within Ohio by buying 
their assets, but acquiring companies elsewhere posed legal difficulties, so Standard’s principals 
treble-damages provision sought to stimulate private antitrust suits.  We depart from this literature by highlighting 
the role played by enforcement mechanisms that were not anticipated by or embodied in statute. 
9 The classic account of the slow development of formal regulatory institutions in the United States is 
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State:  The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-
1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
10 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight:  The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century 
America (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2009), 380. 
11 The best account of Standard’s rise in the 1870s from 4 percent to 90 percent of the industry is Elizabeth 
Granitz and Benjamin Klein, “Monopolization by ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’:  The Standard Oil Case,” Journal of Law 
and Economics 39 (Apr. 1996): 1-47. But see also George L. Priest’s critique, “Rethinking the Economic Basis of 
the Standard Oil Refining Monopoly,” Southern California Law Review 85 (Mar. 2012): 499-557, and Klein’s 
convincing response in the same issue, “The ‘Hub-and Spoke’ Conspiracy that Created the Standard Oil Monopoly,” 
459-498.
   
instead negotiated exchanges of stock with the owners of important out-of-state refineries, who 
in turn acquired competing producers in their home states.  This arrangement, however, made it 
difficult for Standard’s executives to assert managerial control over the acquisitions.  To solve 
that problem, the company turned to the device of the voting trust. Although courts generally 
allowed majority shareholders within companies to use voting trusts to ensure managerial 
control, the device was untested as a tool of horizontal combination.12 Standard first tried it out 
in 1872 when it arranged for stockholders in the Long Island Oil Company of New York to 
transfer their shares in trust to one of Standard’s officers. Over the next few years Standard 
continued to make acquisitions in this way, but executives began to worry about complications 
that might arise if a trustee died or, worse, had a falling out with other officers. To avoid these 
potential problems, they restructured the arrangements in 1879 to substitute boards of three 
trustees for the individual officers. These agreements were then consolidated into one 
overarching contract in 1882 that brought all of the company’s holdings under the control of an 
expanded board of trustees with powers very similar to those of the directors of a holding 
company.13 
Standard’s novel use of the voting trust inspired imitators in a number of other industries, 
ranging from sugar to cottonseed oil to whisky to lead.14 But it also provoked states to take 
action to prohibit this means of evading the law. More than a dozen states had already enacted 
12 For cases supporting such arrangements among shareholders, see Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870); and 
Brown v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 4 F. Cas. 420 (1867). For a summary of the precedents, see Griffith v. Jewett, 
9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627 (1886). 
13 For the details of the acquisitions and the various iterations of the trust agreement, see Allan Nevins, 
Study in Power:  John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), 
Vol. I, Ch. 21; Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R. Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of 
Illumination, 1859-1899 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1959), 466-70; and Ralph W. Hidy and 
Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1911 (New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1955), 40-49. For the text 
of “The Standard Oil Trust Agreement,” see William W. Cook, “Trusts”: The Recent Combinations in Trade, their 
Character, Legality and Mode of Organization … (New York:  L. K. Strouse & Co., 1888), 78-89. 
14 Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, 51. 
   
antitrust laws before Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, and additional states 
followed thereafter. By the end of the century twenty-seven (out of forty-five) states had 
criminalized combinations in restraint of trade or with intent to monopolize, and the number 
would rise to thirty-five by 1915.15   
State attorneys general also began in the late 1880s to launch quo warranto suits to 
revoke the charters of corporations that participated in trusts.16 Ohio’s took direct aim at the 
Standard Oil Company in 1888, seeking a court order to dissolve it on the grounds that 
shareholders had signed over control and management to the trust in clear violation of the 
company’s charter.17  Although Ohio’s supreme court agreed that Standard had violated its 
charter, instead of dissolving the company it simply ordered it to sever its relationship to the 
trust.18 At about the same time, however, attorneys general in four other states (California, 
Illinois, Nebraska, and New York) filed similar actions against other combines, and in each of 
these cases the courts ordered the companies dissolved. In addition, Louisiana secured an 
injunction prohibiting the cotton oil trust from doing business in the state.19 Because these cases 
were brought under state incorporation law, prosecutors had to show only that the companies had 
violated the terms of their charters or that “foreign” corporations (those chartered by other states) 
15 U.S. Bureau of Corporations, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1916), 178; Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems, 341-43; “Legislation: A 
Collection and Survey of State Antitrust Laws,” Columbia Law Review 32 (1932): 347. 
16 On the history of such actions and their broader use in the late nineteenth century, see Nolette, 
“Litigating the ‘Public Interest.’” 
17 According to Allan Nevins, Watson learned about the agreement from Cook’s 1888 book, Trusts, which, 
in addition to reprinting the Standard Oil Trust Agreement, argued that the companies involved had violated their 
charters and challenged government officials to take appropriate action. See Study in Power, Vol. II, 229-230. 
Watson’s “Amended Petition” is reprinted in William M. McKinney, The American and English Corporation Cases, 
Vol. 36 (Northport, NY:  Edward Thompson Co, 1892), 2-15. On the filing of the suit, see also Bruce Bringhurst, 
Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly:  The Standard Oil Cases, 1890-1911 (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1979), 12-
15. 
18 Bringhurst has convincingly criticized the court’s lesser penalty as ineffectual. See Antitrust and the Oil 
Monopoly, Ch. 1. 
19 For information on these and later suits, see Nolette, “Litigating the ‘Public Interest,’” 384-393; and 
May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure,” 500-501. 
   
did not conform to state law. There was no need even to explore the extent to which the 
agreements restrained trade. As New York’s high court declared in a case involving the sugar 
trust, “[T]he defendant corporation has violated its charter and failed in the performance of its 
duties…. Having reached that result it becomes needless to advance into the wider discussion 
over monopolies and competition and restraint of trade….”20 
As scholars have noted, the simple fact that the corporations involved in trusts were 
created and governed by charters granted by their states of domicile, in turn, gave those states a 
powerful antitrust weapon that the federal government did not possess.21  A state could dissolve a 
corporation it had authorized if the company was proven to have violated its charter; it could also 
exclude corporations chartered in other states that did not conform to its laws.  The federal 
government, by contrast, was limited to the remedies of fines and imprisonment authorized by 
the Sherman Act. Some contemporaries thought that the regulatory powers of the states took 
precedence over, and hence constrained, those of the federal government.22  Others worried that 
federal intervention would undermine the states’ authority over their corporate creatures. As 
legal historian Charles McCurdy has shown, Chief Justice Melville Fuller’s infamous distinction 
between manufacturing and commerce in United States v. E. C. Knight (1895) was a deliberate 
effort to preserve the states’ regulatory capacity to prevent companies that operated within their 
bounds from joining combines. If the Court had applied the U.S. Constitution’s commerce 
clause, it would have preempted state law, and Fuller did not want to take such a step if he could 
20 People v. North River Sugar Refining, 121 N.Y. 582 (1890) at 626. 
21 See McCurdy, “Knight Sugar Decision”; and Lamoreaux, Great Merger Movement, Ch. 6. 
22 See, for example, the views of President Grover Cleveland’s attorney general, Richard Olney, in U.S. 
Attorney General, Annual Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), xxvi-xxvii. See also 
Cleveland’s assertion that states had sufficient prosecutorial powers to rein in the trusts in his “Fourth Annual 
Message,” (Dec. 7, 1896) in Addresses and Papers of President Grover Cleveland, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh (New 
York: Unit Book Publishing Co., 1909), 392.  
 avoid it.23  Subsequent attempts to remedy the federal government’s lack of authority over 
corporations by securing a federal incorporation law failed.24 
State authority did not, however, necessarily translate into action. State attorneys general 
exercised prosecutorial discretion about whether or not to proceed against trusts, and they were 
subject to political pressure on both sides of the issue.25 At one extreme, Ohio’s attorney general 
filed suit against Standard Oil despite overt threats to his political future from Republican Party 
bosses.26  At the other, Massachusetts’ attorney general refused to take action despite a concerted 
newspaper campaign demanding that he move against the trusts.27  Although New York’s 
attorney general filed a quo warranto suit against the American Sugar Refining trust when it 
sought to close down a plant in the state, no official had previously taken any action against the 
combine, even though it had been in existence for some years and controlled all the sugar 
23 McCurdy, “Knight Sugar Decision.” The case was United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). See 
also Justice Stephen J. Field’s decision in Paul v. Virginia, refusing to grant corporations the privileges and 
immunities of citizens out of fear of provoking a race to the bottom that would enable “[t]he principal business of 
every State” to be “controlled by corporations created by other States.” The case involved insurance, and to come to 
this determination, Field had to rule that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.” 75 U.S. 
168 (1868) at 182-183. 
24 Melvin Urofsky, “Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era,” American Journal of Legal 
History 26 (Apr. 1982): 160-183; Arthur M. Johnson, “Antitrust Policy in Transition, 1908: Ideal and Reality,” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 (Dec. 1961): 415-434; Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of 
American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 228–285; Daniel A. Crane, “The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era and the 
New Deal,” in Corporations and American Democracy, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and William J. Novak 
(Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2017), 109-138. 
25 Most attorneys general were popularly elected during this period. Nolette, “Litigating the ‘Public 
Interest,’” 377, 394. Roscoe Pound argued that state attorneys general had ample statutory authority to investigate 
quo warranto abuses, yet they rarely exercised that power.  See “Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in 
Equity,” Harvard Law Review 49 (Jan. 1936), 369-395. 
26 Marcus Hanna put the threat on paper in a letter to Attorney General David K. Watson: “From a party 
standpoint, interested in the success of the Republican party, and regarding you as in the line of political promotion, 
I must say that the identification of your office with litigation of this character is a great mistake.” A later attorney 
general claimed that Watson had been offered bribes on six different occasions to drop the case. Bringhurst, 
Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, 14.  
27 Nolette, “Litigating the ‘Public Interest,’” 395. 
   
refineries in the state.  Nor did it challenge any of the other trusts that, like Standard Oil and the 
Cotton Oil Trust, had headquarters in New York City.28  
Even when attorneys general had the political will to bring a quo warranto suit, 
moreover, they might lack the administrative capacity.  Some of the early suits relied on private 
parties to initiate the complaint, coordinate the gathering of evidence, and/or fund the 
proceedings. For example, the Illinois case against the Chicago Gas Trust hinged on the activism 
of the Citizens’ Association of Chicago. The state’s 1872 general incorporation law stipulated 
that corporations could only be formed for legal purposes and required them to declare their 
purpose along with other information when registering with the secretary of state.29 Yet no one in 
that office seems to have noticed that, contrary to law, the Chicago Gas Trust Company had been 
organized in 1887 to control all the companies distributing gas in that city. Francis Peabody, the 
president of the Citizens’ Association of Chicago (CAC), a municipal reform league founded 
after Chicago’s great fire of 1874, brought this fact to the attention of the state attorney general, 
George Hunt, in 1888 and requested that he bring suit against the illegal corporation.30  Hunt 
agreed with Peabody’s assessment, but lacked funds to prepare the case. At its last session, the 
legislature had made only the most meager appropriation for his office: $2,500 for a clerk, $800 
for a stenographer, $700 for a porter and messenger (who also worked for the Supreme Court 
Reporter), and $2,000 for all other expenses.31  The CAC responded to Hunt’s plea for help by 
28 Wayne D. Collins, “Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation,” Fordham Law Review 81 (April 
2013): 2279-2348 at 2327-2328. 
29 Illinois General Assembly, “An Act concerning corporations,” in force July 1, 1872, §1-2. Unless 
otherwise noted, all citations to laws are from the State Session Laws collected by Heinonline, 
https://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Index?index=sslusstate&collection=ssl.  
30 On the founding of the Citizens’ Association of Chicago, see “Address by President Franklin 
MacVeagh,” (Sept. 11, 1874) in Addresses and Reports of the Citizens’ Association of Chicago, 1874-1876 
(Chicago: Hazlitt & Reed, 1876), 3, 8. On the CAC complaint to Hunt, see Illinois Attorney General, Biennial 
Report (Springfield, IL: State Printer, 1890), 35. 
31 “An Act to provide for the ordinary and contingent expenses of the State government …,” approved June 
15, 1887. 
   
paying for a special assistant, and with this aid the attorney general brought a quo warranto suit 
against the company.32  The CAC’s money was well spent.  Writing for the Illinois Supreme 
Court, Justice Benjamin Magruder affirmed the CAC’s position, ruling that the Chicago Gas 
Trust Company had used “the General Incorporation Law to secure a special privilege, 
immunity, or franchise … for a purpose forbidden by the Constitution.”  “To create one 
corporation that it may destroy the energies of all other corporations of a given kind, and suck 
their life-blood out of them, is not a ‘lawful purpose,’” Magruder declared, and he ordered the 
company dissolved.33   
Although the Chicago Gas Trust suit had a successful outcome, the litigation had 
depended on the willingness, and capacity, of a private voluntary association to initiate and fund 
the effort. Pennsylvania similarly obtained help from an association of independent oil producers 
to bring its quo warranto suit against Standard Oil.34 As a general rule, however, state officials 
could not depend on such associations to help them enforce the antitrust laws. The members of 
most organizations were too diverse both in their interests and in their financial means to 
overcome the collective action problems involved in committing significant resources to what 
many regarded as a governmental responsibility.   
According to the conventional narrative, the quo warranto suits initiated in the late 1880s 
marked the highpoint of state antitrust activity.  State officials increasingly recognized that 
dissolving a corporation and banning a foreign corporation from the state were penalties too 
drastic—too threatening to jobs and tax revenues—to be much used, and they began to rely on 
32 Illinois Attorney General, Biennial Report, 41. 
33 People v. Chicago Gas Trust, 130 Ill. 268 (1889) at 298. 
34 See Chester M. Destler, Roger Sherman and the Independent Oil Men (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1967), 83-193. 
   
essentially the same remedies as the federal government.35  As a result, when federal authorities 
stepped up their enforcement efforts in the early twentieth century, state activity waned.36  
According to the conventional narrative, moreover, the powers that states exercised over their 
corporate creatures had already been weakened by New Jersey’s 1888 amendments to its general 
incorporation law.  The amendments enabled corporations to hold stock in other corporations, 
rendering voting trusts unnecessary for the purposes of consolidating managerial control.  As 
combines abandoned the trust form in favor of New Jersey charters, other states responded by 
engaging in what many scholars have termed a race to the bottom, rushing to enact similar 
legislation to prevent companies from relocating their corporate domiciles.37 
Although this account is consistent with the evidence in its broad outlines, it is 
misleading in two important ways.  First, it overstates the extent to which the chartermongering 
competition undermined the regulatory provisions embedded in state antitrust and corporation 
law.38 Although many states followed New Jersey’s lead and enacted legislation permitting 
corporations to hold stock in other enterprises, their antitrust laws continued to prohibit such 
combinations if they restrained trade or tended to create a monopoly. New Jersey itself 
backtracked in 1913, enacting a set of strict antitrust statutes known as the “Seven Sisters” that 
35 By Nolette’s count (“Litigating the ‘Public Interest,’” 388), there were only four more quo warranto suits 
against “trusts”—two successful ones in Illinois that dissolved the United States School Furniture Company (1894) 
and the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company (1895), one in Missouri against the Armour Packing Company 
(1902) that was settled with a fine, and one in Colorado (1902) against the American Smelting and Refining 
Company (1902) that was dismissed by the court on procedural grounds.   
36 Thorelli, Federal Antitrust Policy, 36-50, 235-368; McCurdy, “Knight Sugar Decision”; Lamoreaux, 
Great Merger Movement, Ch. 6. 
37 This point was made as early as 1904 in U.S. Commissioner of Corporations,”Report,” House Doc 165, 
58th Cong. 3d Sess. (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office 1904), 40.  But see also Adolf A. Berle and 
Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:  Macmillan, 1933); William L. 
Cary, “Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections upon Delaware,” Yale Law Journal 83 (Mar. 1974): 663-705; 
and William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 1997). 
38 On this point, see Bruce G. Carruthers and Naomi R. Lamoreaux, “Regulatory Races:  Effects of 
Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards,” Journal of Economic Literature 54 (Mar. 2016): 52-97 at 70-
76.
   
prohibited mergers for the purpose of restraining competition.39 Illinois even imbedded such a 
prohibition in its general incorporation law in 1919, when the legislature revised the statute to 
permit holding companies:  
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital of another corporation, where the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired 
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain trade in this State or in any 
section of community thereof, or tend to create a monopoly.40  
As we will show, this complementarity of state corporation laws and antitrust policy would 
continue to constrain large firms’ anticompetitive behavior long after states supposedly 
abandoned the field to the federal government.  
Second, the conventional story misses the ongoing role of private lawsuits (as opposed to 
private support for public lawsuits) in enforcing the antitrust policy. As is well known, both the 
state and federal statutes included provisions that encouraged private suits. Section 7 of the 
Sherman Act gave a person injured by anticompetitive behavior the right to sue in federal court 
and “recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.”41 State statutes varied, but a considerable number included similar 
inducements. According to one tally, nine states allowed recovery of actual damages, two double 
damages, and nine treble damages.42 Counts of cases filed under the Sherman Act show that the 
number of private suits increased from 16 in the 1890s to 74 in the first decade of the twentieth 
39 These provisions were rigorous enough to spur large companies to take out Delaware charters instead. 
See Christopher Grandy, “New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,” Journal of Economic History 49 
(Sept. 1989): 677-92 at 689. 
40 “An Act in relation to corporations for pecuniary profit,” approved June 28, 1919, §7. 
41 “An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,” approved July 2 
1890, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=51&page=transcript, consulted 19 Aug. 2018. 
42 U.S. Bureau of Corporations, Trust Laws and Unfair Competition, 216. 
   
century.43 Although no one has made a comprehensive count of filings at the state level, the legal 
scholar James May estimated that the number of state-level private antitrust suits increased from 
slightly more than 70 in the 1880s to nearly 200 in the first decade of the twentieth century.44 As 
we show in the next section, moreover, private antitrust enforcement was only the tip of the 
iceberg. Private litigation under state incorporation law also played an important role in 
advancing competition policy. 
The Antitrust Applications of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits 
If state attorneys general lacked the capacity (or the will) to ensure that corporations 
conformed to the law, and if voluntary associations were only sporadically forthcoming with aid, 
there was still the possibility that shareholders would take action. Shareholders could bring direct 
action suits in a court of law if the corporation’s officers had violated their rights, for example, 
by preventing them from voting in a general meeting, or by denying them access to the 
corporation’s books. Shareholders could also file derivative suits in a court of equity if they had 
evidence that the corporation’s officers and directors had engaged in illegal or fraudulent 
activities to the detriment of the firm. The injured party in such suits was technically the 
corporation itself, but if it could be demonstrated that the corporation was under the control of 
the wrongdoers, shareholders had legal standing to take action.45 Most shareholders’ suits 
43 Richard A. Posner, “A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of Law and Economics 13 
(Oct. 1970): 365-419 at 371. 
44 May used the number of private cases reported under the subheading “Restraint of Trade or Competition 
in Trade” in the “Contracts” chapter of the American Digest and the First and Second Decennial Digests as a proxy 
for the trend. May, “Antitrust Practice and Procedure,” 503 n. 61. According to the New York State Bar 
Association’s “Report of the Special Committee to Study the New York State Antitrust Laws” (1957), “most 
reported adjudications” under the state’s 1899 antitrust law, known as the Donnelly Act, “have been private 
actions,” even though the Act included “no express authorization” for such suits and no provision for multiplying 
damage awards (46a). 
45 See J.B., “Distinguishing between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits,” University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 110 (Jun. 1962): 1147-1157.  
   
involved disputes over internal business decisions and hence had nothing to do with competition 
policy.  However, during the merger waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
combines often acquired businesses with the aim of shutting them down.  When shareholders 
who were adversely affected by the closings launched derivative suits, they bolstered their cases 
by claiming that the majority were using their control for illegal purposes under the antitrust 
laws.  In this way, private suits about corporate governance could implicate broader issues of 
competition policy.   
Nineteenth-century policy makers were always of two minds about shareholders’ powers.  
On the one hand, they thought shareholders could serve important public policy goals by acting 
as a check on those in control of corporations. On the other, they worried that shareholders might 
pursue their own opportunistic ends, or that they might clog the courts with disputes that were 
really just differences of opinion about business strategy.  This ambivalence is apparent in the 
laws governing shareholders’ voting rights.  In the late nineteenth century, for example, a 
number of states sought to bolster the power of minority shareholders in corporate decision-
making by mandating cumulative voting for directors.46  Under a cumulative voting regime, 
shareholders received as many votes as there were directors being elected and had the option of 
spreading them over an equal number of candidates, voting them all for one candidate, or 
anything in between.  The idea was that cumulative voting increased the likelihood that minority 
shareholders would have representation on the board.  But legislatures also moved to curb 
shareholders’ ability to block decisions, like mergers, that under the common law had required 
46 For examples of requirements for cumulative voting, see Illinois General Assembly, “An Act concerning 
corporations,” in force July 1,1872, §3; New York Legislature, “An Act to provide for the organization and 
regulation of certain business corporations,” passed June 21, 1875, §26; and Pennsylvania General Assembly, “An 
Act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of certain corporations, approved Apr. 29, 1874, §10.  By 1900, 
17 states had such rules. See Charles Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors (Boston, MA:  Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, 1951), 7-8 and Ch. 2. 
   
unanimous consent.  Following New Jersey’s lead in 1888, states routinized the merger process 
by setting a voting threshold for approval and providing a procedure for buying out objecting 
stockholders at the going market price for the company’s shares. The voting threshold could be 
lower or higher depending on where policy makers wanted to set the balance of power between 
shareholders and directors. New Jersey’s law required only a simple majority vote, but 
California, Illinois, and Massachusetts mandated two-thirds.47  
Judges displayed a similar ambivalence in their handling of derivative suits.  The purpose 
of the suits was to provide shareholders with a remedy in equity against exploitation by corporate 
directors.48 Judges worried, however, that shareholders would use them to extract additional 
income for themselves or that the courts would be deluged with cases challenging directors’ 
business decisions, and so they imposed high evidentiary requirements for such actions. Not only 
did shareholders have to demonstrate that they had no means of addressing the problem through 
normal corporate governance procedures, they also had to show that there was illegal or 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the directors. If the disagreement was simply a matter of 
“business judgment,” or the directors’ discretion, then the courts would not intervene even if the 
corporation had sustained heavy losses.49 The courts were particularly concerned with preventing 
47 New Jersey General Assembly, “An Act relating to the consolidation of corporations …,” approved Apr. 
17, 1888; California General Assembly, “An Act substituting for the existing title one of part four of division first of 
the Civil Code …,” approved June 12, 1931, §361; Illinois General Assembly “An Act in relation to corporations for 
pecuniary profit,” approved June 28, 1919, §67; Massachusetts General Court, “An Act relative to business 
corporations,” approved June 17, 1903, §40. 
48 The concept of a derivative suit was first laid out by New York Chancellor James Kent in Robinson v. 
Smith, 3 Paige 222 (1832). According to Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Kent had earlier hinted at a similar idea in a dictum in 
the 1817 case of Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co. Prunty also traces the notion to two other New York chancery 
cases that preceded Robinson v. Smith and to an Ohio case in 1831. See “The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit:  Notes 
on its Derivation,” New York University Law Review, 32 (issue 5, 1957): 980-994 at 986-988. See also the citations 
in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1856) at 341, in which the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the jurisdiction of 
equity courts in such cases. 
49 See Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850) and 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853); Brewer v. Boston 
Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870); Wardell v. Railroad Company, 103 U.S. 651 (1880); Dunphy v. Traveller 
Newspaper Assoc., 146 Mass. 495 (1888); Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519 (1888); Edison v. Edison United 
   
opportunistic shareholders from holding up deals that corporate officers identified as financially 
necessary or potentially lucrative.50 
Especially in the early years of the antitrust movement, judges’ skepticism about 
derivative suits carried over into cases involving anticompetitive mergers. In 1891, for example, 
a Louisiana court rebuffed a minority shareholder in the Bienville Oil Works, who sued to 
recover damages after the company was dissolved and its assets sold to the American Cotton Oil 
Trust.  A district court in the Parish of Orleans had issued an injunction prohibiting the trust from 
doing business in the state because it had not incorporated under state laws, paid no taxes, and 
aimed to monopolize Southern oil mills.51  Piggybacking on this case, the Bienville shareholder 
claimed that the directors had, “by a secret and fraudulent combination and bargain with the 
American Oil Trust, an alleged unlawful organization,” transferred their stock to the trust “to 
subserve its own interests, and in disregard of their obligations to the other stock holders and in 
violation of their rights, ... thereby destroying the value of its stock other than that held by the 
trust.”52 The Louisiana Supreme Court determined, however, that the plaintiff—“an unfortunate 
and improvident loser”—could have followed the other stockholders’ example and exchanged 
his shares for certificates in the trust.  “Had he done so, he would have realized the fabulous 
profits which he says they have … reaped.”  Even after the deadline for the exchange expired, he 
was offered some money for his shares, but he held out for a higher price. His losses were his 
own fault, and he had “no occasion legally to complain.” In the absence of any express statutory 
Phonograph Co. 52 N.J. Eq. 620 (1894); Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287 (1899); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 
(1881). 
50 William J. Carney, “Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes,” 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1980 (Winter 1980): 69-132. 
51 See State v. American Cotton Oil Trust, 40 La. Ann. 8 (1888), upholding the lower court’s dismissal of 
an injunction against a brokerage firm for selling the trust’s securities, as stated in State v. American Cotton Oil 
Trust, 1 Railway and Corporate Law Journal 1 (1887): 509-513. 
52 Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45 (1891) at 47-48. 
   
prohibition or fraud, the requisite majority of stockholders had “absolute” discretion to wind up 
the corporation’s affairs “for reasons by them deemed sufficient,” and the court had no authority 
to second-guess their decision.53    
Despite this blanket assertion of the court’s lack of authority, judges were willing to limit 
shareholders’ “absolute” discretion in cases where government officials, rather than minority 
shareholders, challenged a merger as ultra vires.  For example, in an action brought by 
Nebraska’s attorney general to revoke the charter of a corporation whose shareholders sold its 
property to another corporation as a step toward acquisition by a trust, the court ruled that “the 
fact that the corporation has authority to put an end to its existence by a vote of a majority of its 
stockholders … does not authorize it to terminate its existence by a sale and disposal of all its 
property and rights.”54 Similarly, New York’s successful quo warranto suit against the sugar 
trust was triggered by the acquisition and immediate closure of a refinery within the state.55   
Judges were reluctant, however, to allow shareholders to usurp the attorney general’s 
powers and make claims on the basis of public policy.  Thus Illinois’s supreme court dismissed a 
suit by a shareholder who sought the dissolution of the National Linseed Oil Company on the 
grounds that it was an illegal combination, ruling that “only the State can complain of injury to 
the public or that public rights are being interfered with, and enforce a forfeiture of defendant’s 
franchise for that reason.”56 In this case, the state’s activist attorney general, Maurice Moloney, 
53 Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45 (1891) at 49-50. For cases in other states brought by minority 
shareholders that had similar outcomes, see Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Railways, 49 N.J. Eq. 217 (1891); 
Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 56 N.Y.S. 288 (1899).  
54 State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890) at 719. 
55 Collins, “Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation,” 2327-2328.  Collins argues that many of the 
quo warranto suits were responses to plant closures. 
56 Coquard v. National Linseed Oil Co., 171 Ill. 480 (1898) at 484. In this case, the plaintiff had another 
strike against him—he had been a party to the trust. 
   
followed up on the shareholder’s action by filing a quo warranto suit, which National Linseed 
belittled in a statement as just “a rehash of a bill previously filed” by a stockholder.57 
Nonetheless, as the great merger movement gained momentum, judges who supported the 
anti-monopoly agenda began to lay out a legal justification for allowing private derivative suits 
that served public antitrust objectives.  Only one year after it dismissed the shareholder’s case 
against National Linseed, the Illinois Supreme Court permitted a shareholder to block a state-
chartered corporation from disposing of its factory to a combine, the American Glucose 
Company (a New Jersey corporation).58 Justice Magruder wrote the opinion in the case.  A 
thrice-elected Republican jurist, he had earlier penned the decision dissolving the Chicago Gas 
Trust, and he would be remembered, after his death, for his “righteous indignation at the schemes 
of fraud and indiscretion by which some of the great enterprises of modern business life have 
been accomplished.”59  After a detailed recounting of the glucose combination’s scheme to have 
“six corporations shut down their manufactories, and abandon their business” for the purpose of 
reducing competition in the industry, Magruder ruled that the stockholder who brought the case 
had standing to sue because the value of his shares would be adversely affected by the planned 
abandonment of the plant. “If the purpose of such dissolution is not the bona fide discontinuance 
of the business, but is the continuance of the business by another new corporation, … the 
dissolution is practically a fraud on dissenting stockholders.”60 That declaration would normally 
have been enough to decide the case and allow the dissenting shareholders to prevent the 
dissolution, but Magruder went further. Citing William Cook’s treatise on corporations, he 
57 “Illinois Corporations in Court,” Paint, Oil and Drug Review 21 (Jan. 15, 1896), 11. See also People v. 
National Linseed Oil Co., as reported in Biennial Report of the Auditor of Public Accounts to the Governor of 
Illinois, Nov. 1896 (Springfield, IL: State Printer, 1897), 182-194. 
58 Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899). 
59 “Memorial of the Late Benjamin Drake Magruder of the Illinois Supreme Court,” Chicago Legal News, 
43 (1910): 85.  
60 Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899) at 601, 628, 632. 
   
asserted that selling the company to the combine exceeded the powers of the corporate directors 
and violated public policy and law.61  
[A]ny act or proposed act of the corporation, or of the directors, or of a majority of the
stockholders, which is not within the expressed or implied powers of the charter of 
incorporation, or of association—in other words, any ultra vires act—is a breach of the 
contract between the corporation and each one of its stockholders.”62   
Therefore, “any one or more of the stockholders may object thereto, and compel the corporation 
to observe the terms of the contract as set forth in the charter.”63 
This ruling granted shareholders formidable powers to challenge anti-competitive 
combinations.  That the court intended to embolden shareholders to contest mergers was 
confirmed a few years later in Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), 
an opinion written by another long-serving Republican jurist on the Illinois Supreme Court, 
Jacob W. Wilkin.  Shareholders in the Kellogg Switchboard and Supply Company had brought 
suit to prevent AT&T from acquiring it.64 As in the American Glucose case, the court held that 
AT&T had purchased the company’s stock with “the unlawful purpose and intention of putting 
the Kellogg company out of business or so using and controlling it as to prevent rivalry in 
business and creating a monopoly.”65  The acquisition “was an attempt to exercise a power which 
[AT&T] did not have”; to allow it go ahead “would be against the law of this State and its public 
61 See, for example, Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899) at 615. 
62 Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899) at 631.  The citation is to William W. Cook, A 
Treatise on the Law of Corporations Having a Capital Stock (4th edn; Chicago:  Callaghan, 1898), Vol. 2, §69-70. 
63 Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (1899) at 631. 
64 Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9 (1906) at 26. For another similarly decided 
case, see Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 F. 869 (1907). 
65 Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9 (1906) at 22. The judge cited the Chicago 
Gas Trust and American Glucose cases, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Securities v. U.S., 
193 U.S. 197 (1905). 
   
policy.”66 If AT&T’s purchase furthered monopoly, “then it would seem to follow that each and 
every stockholder” in the switchboard company had the right to sue to restrain AT&T from 
voting “stock which it did not and could not legally own.”67 In other words, every individual 
shareholder was potentially a weapon in the struggle against monopoly. 
Judges nonetheless remained wary of opportunistic shareholders and, especially where 
antitrust concerns were not involved, continued to impose high barriers to derivative suits. The 
very next year after the Illinois Supreme Court found against AT&T in Dunbar, an appeals court 
in the same state dismissed a suit by shareholders in the Universal Voting Machine Company 
who charged that the directors had “fraudulently contrived to wreck” their company by 
transferring its property to an out-of-state corporation. The court distinguished the case from 
Dunbar, which also involved a foreign corporation, on the grounds that the transfer did “not 
appear to have been performed for the furtherance of any illegal trust or combination.” Because 
the acquisition was not “contrary to the general public policy of the state of Illinois,” the court 
would not intervene. “To grant the relief prayed would be clearly an interference with the 
internal management of a foreign company” and therefore beyond the court’s jurisdiction.68 
Nonetheless, the Dunbar and American Glucose cases show how judges’ concerns about 
anticompetitive mergers could override their worries about derivative suits.  Whether 
opportunistic or not, shareholders offered jurists a valuable ally in an environment where 
attorneys general often lacked either the capacity or the will to move against monopolistic 
combinations. 
66 Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9 (1906) at 25. 
67 Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 9 (1906) at 26. 
68 Sprague v Universal Voting Machine Co., 134 Ill. App. 379 (1907) at 380, 384-385. 
   
Shareholders’ Challenges to the Use of Voting Trusts as Tools of Monopoly Control 
Just as legal thinking about shareholders’ derivative suits evolved in response to large-
scale combinations, so too did the rules governing shareholders’ rights with respect to corporate 
voting trusts.  Traditionally judges had seen nothing wrong with voting trusts and had generally 
been unreceptive to shareholders’ suits to invalidate them.  The rise of Standard Oil and other 
similar combines, however, seems to have subtly changed their views and by the late 1880s, 
judges began to question the validity of voting trusts in which stockholders irrevocably 
transferred control over their shares to a set of trustees—precisely the kinds of agreements that 
companies like Standard were using to assert managerial authority over their acquisitions.  Once 
the trusts moved to reorganize as New Jersey corporations this shift in judicial thinking lost 
much of its momentum.  It revived, however, after revelations during the Pujo “money trust” 
hearings that bankers like J. P. Morgan were using voting trusts to control key sectors of the 
American economy, and the resurgence of this view threatened to make voting trusts unusable 
even for purposes generally regarded as legitimate. 
The first judicial turn against irrevocable voting trusts began with a local court decision, 
handed down in Standard’s home state of Ohio during a period when concern about horizontal 
combinations was rising.  The case, Griffith v. Jewett (1886), had its origins in a battle for 
control of the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railroad waged by representatives of the Erie 
railroad; the Erie’s former present, Hugh J. Jewett; and other railroad interests.69   The suit was 
69 This case was actually the second of two.  In the first case, a trust was formed to transfer control of the 
Ohio railroad to the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad in exchange for a guarantee to participating 
shareholders of dividends of six percent a year. In 1885, a shareholder not in the trust brought suit to have the 
agreement declared void. The court complied, finding that the trust had illegally transferred control of an Ohio 
corporation to a New York corporation. Additionally, the shareholders in the trust had violated their duty to fellow 
stockholders “to vote for directors of the company with an eye singly to its best interests.” Those shareholders had 
effectively “sold their power to vote” their stock to New York financiers. Such a sale was illegal “for much the same 
reason” as would be the “sale of his vote by a citizen at the polls.” The trust was subsequently reconstituted to meet 
   
brought by investors allied with Collis P. Huntington after they were refused permission to 
withdraw from a voting trust that Jewett controlled. Although the judge, following precedent, 
found nothing illegal about the trust agreement per se, he broke new ground by ruling that 
shareholders could not be prevented from pulling out of it if they so desired. Voting trusts could 
not be irrevocable, he asserted, because otherwise “it may come to pass that the ownership of a 
majority of the stock of a company may be vested in one set of persons, and the control of the 
company irrevocably invested in others.” Such a state of affairs would be “intolerable” and 
contrary to the “universal policy” of law that “the right to vote is an incident to the ownership of 
stock, and [cannot] exist apart from it.”70 This “intolerable” state of affairs, of course, was 
exactly what was happening at that very moment in the companies acquired by Standard Oil and 
the other trusts, although the judge did not make the connection in his opinion.  
The decision in Griffith v. Jewett was reported in the Weekly Law Bulletin and, either in 
through that publication or through press coverage of the conflict, it came to the attention of 
Simeon E. Baldwin, a prominent professor at the Yale Law School and later chief justice of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court.71 Baldwin agreed to represent a group of shareholders seeking to 
withdraw from a voting trust formed to transfer control over the Shepaug, Litchfield & Northern 
Railroad to the Mercantile Trust Company of New York, and he probably brought the Griffith 
the court’s objections, leading to the second case. Simeon E. Baldwin, “Voting-Trusts,” Yale Law Journal 1 (Oct. 
1891): 1-15 at 6-8. For the first case, see Hafer v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co., Weekly Law 
Bulletin 15 (27 July 1885), 68-72 at 71. The disputes received extensive coverage in the press, in both New York 
and Cincinnati.  See, for examples, “The E., H. and D.-Erie Contract,” Cincinnati Enquirer, April 24, 1885, 5; 
“Taking Mr. Jewett’s Side,” New York Times, May 19, 1885, 5; “Progress in the C., H. and D. Case,” Cincinnati 
Enquirer, June 9, 1886, 6. 
70 Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627 (1886). 
71 “Simeon Eben Baldwin,” Museum of Connecticut History, 
https://museumofcthistory.org/2015/08/simeon-eben-baldwin/, accessed Feb. 27, 2019. Baldwin footnoted the 
Weekly Law Bulletin as his source for the case in “Voting Trusts,” 10, but he also mentioned that the case had been 
cited approvingly by a federal circuit court judge in Woodruff v. Dubuque & S.C.R Co., 30 F. 91 (1887).  In that 
case, the judge allowed a shareholder to revoke a power of attorney that granted Drexel, Morgan & Co. the power to 
sell his stock and vote it in the interim. 
   
case to the attention of the Connecticut judge hearing his suit.  In any event, the judge not only 
cited the Ohio decision in his opinion invalidating the trust but elaborated on the court’s ruling:  
It is the policy of our law that ownership of stock shall control the property and the 
management of the corporation, and … this good policy is defeated, if stockholders are 
permitted to surrender all their discretion and will in the important matter of voting, and 
suffer themselves to be mere passive instruments in the hands of some agent who has no 
interest in the stock, equitable or legal, and no interest in the general prosperity of the 
corporation.72   
Voting was a duty that the shareholder owed to other members of the corporation. The 
shareholder “may shirk it perhaps by refusing to attend stockholders’ meetings, or by declining 
to vote when called upon, but the law will not allow him to strip himself of the power to perform 
his duty.”73 
Baldwin followed up his win in this case with an article in the 1891 volume of the Yale 
Law Journal in which he summarized the Shepaug decision and the cases that preceded it with 
the explicit purpose of making them “accessible to the profession.”74 He seems to have 
succeeded in his purpose for, just two years later, the Connecticut judge’s words found their way 
into a New Jersey chancery court decision, White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Company.75  The 
New Jersey court had already come to the conclusion that voting trusts could not be irrevocable 
in Cone v. Russell and Mason (1891), but it had decided that case without knowledge of the 
72 Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553 (1890) at 579.  For similar decisions from around the same 
time, see also Woodruff v. Dubuque & S.C.R. Co., 30 F. 91 (1887); and Vanderbilt v. Bennett, a case in a 
Pennsylvania county court also described in Baldwin, “Voting-Trusts.” 
73 Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553 (1890) at 579-580. 
74 Baldwin, “Voting-Trusts,” 14. 
75 White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 178 (1893).  On the chronology and importance off 
these cases, see Marion Smith, “Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,” Columbia Law Review 22 (Nov. 
1922), 627-637 at 628. 
   
Connecticut litigation.76 The two streams of case law thus came together in the White case, and a 
flurry of similar decisions followed based on the Connecticut and New Jersey precedents.77   
There were still, however, some contrary cases that upheld shareholders’ contractual 
freedom to enter into voting-trust agreements, whether they were revocable or not.78  After 
Standard and other combines abandoned the voting trust in favor of New Jersey charters, 
concerns about the misuse of these agreements ebbed, and decisions that enforced voting trusts 
increased in frequency relative to those that invalidated them.79 Judge James Keith of the 
Virginia Supreme Court reflected on this shift in a 1910 decision upholding a voting trust:  “[I]t 
is impossible not to be impressed with the change of opinion which has taken place with respect 
to the true nature of such contracts.” Whereas “a very strong sentiment” against voting trusts had 
once prevailed, “experience has demonstrated their usefulness, and the hostility evinced toward 
them has by degrees diminished.”80 For Keith, the preceding decade of private action suits had 
clarified the legal parameters of voting trust agreements and, in the absence of a statute 
regulating such agreements, he thought voting trusts should be judged by the reasonableness of 
their objectives.  “Where the object of the trust is legitimate … the trust should be upheld and 
carried out.”81 
76 Cone v. Russell & Mason, 48 N.J. Eq. 208 (1891).  This case had no antitrust dimension.  It involved the 
use of a voting trust to entrench a particular stockholder in a managerial position. 
77 Harvey v. Linville Improvement Co., 118 N.C. 693 (1896); Kreissl v. Distilling Co. of America, 61 N.J. 
Eq. 5 (1900); Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353 (1904); Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625 (1908); Sheppard v. Rockingham 
Power Co., 150 N.C. 776 (1909); Bridgers v. First National Bank, 152 N.C. 293 (1910); and Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 
170 (1915). In another case, State v. O. & M.R.R. Co., 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 518 (1892), the court upheld a voting trust 
but noted that it would have been invalid if irrevocable.  
78 Mobile & Ohio Railroad v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92 (1893); Smith v. San Francisco & North Pacific 
Railway Co., 115 Cal. 584 (1897); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105 (1900). 
79 Chapman v. Bates, 61 N.J.Eq. 658 (1900); Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398 (1910); Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 
N.H. 351 (1912); Carnagie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co. of America, 111 Va. 1 (1910); Thompson-
Starrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282 (1912); Winsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62 (1911).   
80 Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., 111 Va. 1 (1910) at 20. 
81 Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., 111 Va. 1 (1910) at 23. 
   
How the case law would have evolved in the absence of the so-called “Money Trust” 
hearings is impossible to tell, but the 1913 Congressional investigation, which concluded that 
bankers were using voting trusts for the purpose of monopolistic control, renewed concerns 
about such devices and increased judges’ propensity to invalidate them.  Headed by Louisiana 
Representative Arsène Pujo, the committee focused on the activities of J. P. Morgan & Company 
and allied banking houses and detailed the ways in which these financiers used interlocking 
directorates and voting trusts to assert control over important sectors of the American economy.82 
Although scholars have challenged the validity of the committee’s findings,83 the hearings were 
enormously influential, dominating newspaper headlines whenever prominent witnesses like J. P. 
Morgan were called to testify and also when the committee issued its final report in 1913.  The 
investigation’s impact was magnified, moreover, by a series of polemical essays that Louis 
Brandeis published in Harper’s Weekly in late 1913 and early 1914 under the title “Breaking the 
Money Trust.”  The essays were subsequently collected and published, along with a few other 
pieces on the same subject, in a popular book entitled Other People’s Money and How the 
Bankers Use It, which echoed the Pujo Committee’s findings.84  
According to the Pujo Committee’s report and Brandeis’s exposé, the bankers extended 
their dominance over a myriad of other businesses, financial and industrial, by means that 
included direct investments, interlocking directorates, and voting trusts. Because voting trusts did 
82 See U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee.” 
83 See, for examples, Vincent P. Carosso, “The Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo through Medina,” 
Business History Review 47 (Winter 1973): 421-437; J. Bradford DeLong, “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An 
Economist’s Perspective on Finance Capitalism,” in Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the 
Use of Information, ed. Peter Temin (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1991): 205-250; and Mary A. 
O’Sullivan, Dividends of Development:  Securities Markets in the History of U.S. Capitalism, 1866-1922 (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2016), Ch. 7. 
84 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York:  Fredrick A. Stokes, 
1914).  On the book’s publication history, see Paul P. Abrahams, “Brandeis and Lamont on Finance Capitalism,” 
Business History Review 47 (Spring 1973): 72-94 at 73. 
   
not require the bankers to make any substantial investment outlays, they frequently resorted to 
them to manage non-financial companies.  Morgan had first experimented with the device in 
1886 to reorganize the bankrupt Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, using a voting trust to shift 
oversight of the railroad’s business to a board of trustees that he headed. The trustees not only 
monitored the internal operation of the road but negotiated a division of the market with the 
Pennsylvania Railroad and organized a pool among anthracite coal producers, the railroad’s main 
source of freight. From the beginning, therefore, the use of the device to reorganize an insolvent 
railroad was coupled with initiatives to reduce competition among the roads and also among their 
most important customers.85 The experiment turned out to be so successful that Morgan repeated 
it again and again, and his example was widely copied by other bankers. At the time of the Pujo 
hearings, Morgan and allied bankers were using voting trusts to assert managerial authority over 
a wide variety of concerns, including the Bankers Trust Company, the Guaranty Trust Company, 
the Southern Railway Company, the Chicago Great Western Railroad, the Cincinnati, Hamilton 
& Dayton Railway, the International Mercantile Marine Company, William Cramp Ship & 
Engine Building Company, and the International Agriculture Corporation.86   
Although the Pujo committee was primarily concerned with documenting the ways in 
which the Money Trust had extended its control over major sectors of the economy, the 
investigation also emphasized the dire effects that banker-dominated voting trusts could have on 
minority shareholders in the affected companies. The report accused Morgan and other bankers 
of abusing their positions of control by extracting high fees for their underwriting services and 
85 Vincent P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers, 1854-1913 (Cambridge, Mass.:  
Harvard University Press, 1987), 260-262.  Morgan was not the first to use voting trusts for the purpose of 
reorganizing a railroad.  See Cushing, Voting Trusts, 4-10. 
86 U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 57-91. 
   
acquiring securities at prices below their fair market value.87 The investigators also accused 
Morgan of more direct forms of minority oppression. For example, when the voting trust that had 
originally been formed to reorganize the Southern Railway expired in 1902, Morgan asked 
certificate holders to extend the agreement. A majority agreed to the extension and obtained new 
trust certificates to replace the old. The new certificates were then listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, and the old ones delisted. Only the railroad’s trust certificates traded on the exchange, 
not its shares. As a result, the holders of 183,938 shares who had voted against joining the new 
trust “found themselves with a security not listed on the exchange, and, therefore, without a 
ready market and not available as collateral.”88 Accounts from the time treated the delisting as 
punishment for the “stubborn” shareholders’ refusal to support the renewal of the trust.  As one 
newspaper put it, “recalcitrant stockholders” were “feeling the iron hand of the financial 
autocrat.”89 When the Pujo committee revisited these events a decade later, the situation for these 
shareholders had little improved, as Morgan’s voting trust still controlled the railroad.   
Revelations of this kind of minority oppression provoked judges to rethink their 
acquiescence in voting trusts.  There is no smoking gun in their rulings in the form of an explicit 
mention of the Pujo hearings, which is not surprising.  That there was a rethinking, however, can 
be seen in two contrasting decisions about voting trusts handed down by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in 1913 and 1915, both written by the court’s chief justice, Frank K. Dunn.  The first, 
Venner v. Chicago City Railway Company, made its way through the courts at the same time as 
the Money Trust investigation was going on.90  It was a derivative suit that targeted Morgan 
87 U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 133-35. Another theme of the report was the 
lack of benefit to depositors who put their savings in the commercial banks involved in the Money Trust. See, for 
example, p. 133.  See also Brandeis, Other People’s Money, Ch. 1. 
88 U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 40-41. 
89  “No Market on ‘Change for ‘Stubborn’ Southern Stockholders: Morgan Shows his Hand:  Opponents of 
Voting Trust Are Punished: Litigation May Follow,” Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal Nov. 12, 1902, 8. 
90 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913). 
   
directly and charged him with using a voting trust to combine Chicago’s street railway lines into 
an illegal monopoly. In this case, the court upheld the agreement, in part because the suit was 
brought by just the kind of opportunistic litigant calculated to raise judges’ suspicions.  The 
second case, Luthy v. Ream (1915), involved a single firm, the Peru Plow Company and had no 
antimonopoly implications.91  Nonetheless, the suit turned on issues that the Pujo hearings had 
made notorious, including charges that the voting trust was a cover for insider dealing. Not only 
did the plaintiffs win, but Chief Justice Dunn used his decision to attack the very possibility of 
using voting trusts as a tool of corporate control, insisting that they must be made revocable at 
the will of the shareholders. 
The plaintiff in the suit against the Chicago City Railway Company (CCRC), Clarence H. 
Venner, had already established an unsavory reputation as a serial litigant by filing numerous 
derivative actions against deep-pocket financiers such as J. P. Morgan and major public 
corporations such as U.S. Steel, AT&T, and New York Life Insurance Company.92 Time 
Magazine later described him as a “private profiteer”: 
He first buys a few shares in a company, then ploughs his way through charters, bylaws, 
reorganization plans, indentures, until he turns up a crop of legal weeds. Company 
officials are duly informed of irregularities. If they do not see fit to buy up his stock at a 
thumping good price, into the courts goes Old Man Venner, pleading the cause of a poor, 
downtrodden minority stockholder.93 
91 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915). 
92 For a brief overview of Venner’s place in the history of twentieth-century derivative suits, see John C. 
Coffee, Jr.., Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2015), 34-36. See also J. A. Livingston, The American Stockholder (Philadelphia:  J. B. Lippincott, 1958), 49-55. A 
search through LexisNexis shows that, between 1889 and 1927, Venner brought suit as a stockholder against U.S. 
Steel Corp., numerous railroads, American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Amalgamated Copper Co., New York Life 
Ins., Bethlehem Steel Corp., and American Hide & Leather Co., to name a few. 
93 “Old Sue-&-Settle Man,” Time, Nov. 21, 1932, 39. 
  
Even when he lost in court, which he mostly did, he would continue his campaign of legal 
harassment until the company bought him out.  According to a later count, for example, Venner’s 
actions against the New York Central Railroad, “extended over 14 years, involved 12 suits in 4 
jurisdictions, employed 4 nominal plaintiffs, left 29 cases in the reports, and reached the United 
States Supreme Court 5 times.”94 Similarly, an attorney for U.S. Steel reported in 1902 on the 
“extremely disagreeable” series of negotiations he had with Venner over a period of two years, 
until Venner finally agreed to sell his five thousand shares of U.S. Steel common stock for 
$100,000—an exorbitant sum in the attorney’s view.95 By the time of the CCRC case, this kind 
of behavior had so tarnished Venner’s reputation that a federal judge in a parallel New York City 
lawsuit, also involving a transit consolidation, accused him of buying shares in one of the 
companies simply to have standing to sue: “Much time has been devoted to picturing the evil 
result of monopoly,” he observed sarcastically, “but nothing has been done toward showing that 
complainant had lost a dollar by exactly what Mr. Venner knew was going to be done when he 
caused the stock to be purchased.”96  
Venner bought a minority interest in the Chicago City Railway Company and used his 
status as a shareholder to challenge the legality of the voting trust formed to coordinate the 
operations of the CCRC and four other street railway lines in the city of Chicago.  Morgan, 
whose bank controlled a majority interest in the CCRC, tried to engineer the deal in a way that 
94 “Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit,” Columbia Law Review 34 (Nov. 1934): 1308-1321 
at 1308, n1.  
95 See the account in Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 1819-1947 (New York: 
privately printed, 1948), Vol. 1, 692, pertaining to Venner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 116 Fed. 1012 (1902). We do not 
know how much profit Venner earned on this transaction, but in another case against the Great Northern Railway, he 
got $513,000 for shares that had cost him $188,587. See Livingston, American Stockholder, 50. Another account has 
him receiving $300,000 for $70,000 worth of Union Pacific Railroad Stock and earning somewhere between one 
and two million dollars off the Great Northern. See “Extortionate Corporate Litigation,” 1308, n1. 
96 Quoted in “Venner Loses Suits against Interboro,” New York Times (4 Jun. 1913), 7. See Continental 
Securities v. Interborough Rapid Trans Co., 207 F. 467 (1913) at 472, affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 221 F. 44 (1915). 
   
made it seem to outsiders as if he were being bought out by local interests and barely breaking 
even on the sale.97  Later revelations showed, however, that Morgan was still very much 
involved.98 At the time of the agreement, two of his representatives held a controlling interest in 
the CCRC, as well as all the stock and bonds of the other four railways in the agreement.  The 
trust itself was run by people from Morgan’s circle, including Judge Elbert Gary of the United 
States Steel Corporation, and the lead underwriter for the trust’s bonds, the First Trust and 
Savings Bank of Chicago, was an affiliate of the First National Bank of Chicago, a Morgan 
ally.99  Venner filed his suit almost immediately after the deal was announced, naming Morgan, 
along with the CCRC, as a defendant and charging that the trust agreement “irrevocably 
deprived” shareholders of their “deliberative powers and duties” and transferred management of 
the railway to “the hands of strangers.” He further charged that the effect of the trust agreement 
was to create an illegal transit monopoly in the city of Chicago.100   
In his opinion for the Illinois Supreme Court, Chief Justice Dunn systematically rejected 
each of Venner’s charges.  Reaching back for precedent to an earlier Illinois case, Faulds v. 
Yates, decided in 1870—long before Griffith v. Jewett, Shepaug, or any of the other cases 
invalidating irrevocable voting trusts—he ruled that voting trusts had long been recognized by 
the courts as an acceptable means of centralizing managerial or financial control in 
97 “Home Rule Unites South Side Lines,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec. 27, 1909, 1; “Morgan Gets Out of 
Chicago Traction,” New York Times, Dec. 27, 1909), 1. 
98 “Traction Merger Wind and Water?” Chicago Daily Tribune, Dec. 31, 1909, 1. 
99 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 535-536. On Morgan’s connections with the 
First National Bank of Chicago, see Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States: From J. P. 
Morgan to the Institutional Investor (1900-1970) (Armonk, NY:  M. E. Sharpe, 2002), Vol. 2, 24. 
100 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 539-543.  To the press, Venner also charged 
that the purpose of the merger was to deflect the CCRC’s earnings to shore up the “tottering properties of the other 
companies,” but he seems not to have made this case to the court, perhaps because there was as yet no track record 
for him to cite. After Venner lost his suit, however, a group of discontented minority shareholders waged a proxy 
fight for control of the railroad and made essentially the same complaint.  See “Opposes Chicago Merger,” New 
York Times, Jan. 23, 1910, 5; “Protest Against Car Merger Plan,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Oct. 11, 1913, 9. 
   
corporations.101 He bolstered that assertion by noting that Faulds had “been sustained by later 
decisions of this court” and also by the courts of other states, citing in particular two prominent 
cases that had spearheaded the trend back toward validating voting trusts, Smith v. San Francisco 
and North Pacific Railway Company (California, 1897) and Brightman v. Bates (Massachusetts, 
1900).102  Dunn recognized that there had been an important string of contrary decisions in 
between Faulds and these turn-of-the-century cases, and he even affirmed them in dicta.  
However, he dismissed their relevance to Venner’s suit. The contrary cases had been brought by 
shareholders seeking to withdraw their securities from voting trusts, but since Venner was not a 
party to the CCRC trust agreement, those precedents did not apply.103  “A majority of the 
stockholders may … confer upon an agent unlimited discretion to vote their stock, and there is 
no policy of the law to prevent their transferring the stock to a trustee with the like unrestricted 
power.”104  
If voting trusts were not illegal per se, “[i]t is the purpose for which the trust was created 
which must determine its legality.”105 Dunn found Venner’s claim that Morgan was creating an 
illegal transit monopoly unconvincing because most of the arrangements for the consolidated 
operation of the street railway system had been mandated by a city ordinance and, indeed, 
Venner had previously challenged the legality of the ordinance before the same court and lost.106 
The one exception was the proposed merger of the elevated with the street railway lines, which 
still required enabling legislation by the state as well as approval by the city.  The railways 
denied they were proceeding with the plan without such authorization, and Dunn dismissed 
101 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 539.  See Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870). 
102 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 539. 
103 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 541. 
104 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 540. 
105 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 540. 
106 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 236 Ill. 349 (1908). 
   
Venner’s charges as “mere apprehension.”  Although “anticipated unlawful acts of the directors 
of a corporation may furnish ground for an injunction, fear, alone, of such illegal action is not 
sufficient.”107 
Just two years later, however, in the wake of the Pujo report and Brandeis’s influential 
writings about the machinations of the Money Trust, Dunn took a position in Luthy v. Ream that 
severely limited the use of voting trusts, whether their purpose was illegal or not. Luthy involved 
charges of self-dealing against officers of the Peru Plow Company, who, minority shareholders 
complained, had used their control of a voting trust to set their own salaries. The trial court 
declared the trust void and the salaries illegally set. The appeals court agreed about the salaries 
but, quoting extensively from Dunn’s opinion in Venner v. Chicago City Railway, overturned the 
trial court’s ruling that the trust was invalid.108  The plaintiffs then appealed to the Illinois 
Supreme Court, which sided with the trial judge on both issues. In his opinion for the court, 
Chief Justice Dunn could have simply ruled that the plow company’s voting trust served an 
illegal purpose and was therefore invalid.  He went much further, however.  Quoting extensively 
from the opinion of the local Connecticut judge in the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, he declared 
that shareholders could not irrevocably commit their shares to voting trusts, laying out the 
blanket rule that shareholders could not “be deprived or deprive themselves” of their voting 
power. “It matters not whether the end be beneficial,” he continued, “because it is not always 
possible to ascertain objects and motives, and if such a severance were permissible it might be 
abused.”109   
107 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 550. 
108 Luthy v. Ream, 190 Ill. App. 315 (1914). 
109 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915) at 178-180. Dunn was quoting from Charles Fisk Beach, 
Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations (Chicago:  T. H. Flood, 1891), Vol. 1, §306. 
   
Dunn acknowledged that he had previously held, in Venner, that it was “legitimate for the 
owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation to combine” through a voting trust or other 
similar arrangement.110 He justified his different ruling in Luthy by claiming that the Peru Plow 
agreement went “much farther than any case which has heretofore arisen in this court” by 
separating the voting power of the stock from its ownership for a fixed term of ten years, “so that 
the real owners of the property are for that time entirely divested of its management and 
control.”111  The agreement in the CCRC case, by contrast, had specified a complicated 
mechanism whereby shareholders in the trust voted annually for a committee of eight who then 
instructed the trustees on the choice of directors, maintaining at least the fiction of shareholders’ 
control.112  However, the decision in Luthy turned on the issue of revocability, and it is not at all 
clear that the Peru Plow agreement was different in this respect from the voting trust in the 
CCRC case.  In the earlier case, the court had simply refused to look into the matter on the 
grounds that Venner was not a party to the agreement: “Whether the agreement binds all the 
shareholders so that they cannot withdraw from it is a question which does not concern the 
appellant.  So long as the shareholders are satisfied and continue to act in accordance with it no 
one else has any right to complain.”113  For all practical purposes, moreover, Dunn admitted that 
Luthy represented a reversal when he acknowledged that Smith v. San Francisco and North 
Pacific Railroad and the other pro-voting trust cases, which he had cited as precedents in 
Venner, were “inconsistent” with the “the true rule” as stated in the Luthy decision and cases like 
Shepaug. 
110 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915) at 177. 
111 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915) at 178. 
112 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170 (1915) at 181; Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 
541. 
113 Venner v. Chicago City Railway Co., 258 Ill. 523 (1913) at 541-542. 
   
Although Dunn made no reference to the Pujo report in his Luthy decision, contemporary 
legal observers blamed the hearing for the shift in the court’s attitude and its resuscitation of 
precedents from the 1890s. In an often-cited review essay, for example, Fordham University law 
professor I. Maurice Wormser disapprovingly summarized the findings of Pujo committee, 
asserting that its “agitation was not without its effect upon the courts” and citing Luthy v. Ream 
as an “unprogressive and reactionary” decision that reflected “the popular whim and caprice of 
the passing moment.”114  Other legal scholars, however, applauded the new trend.  Responding 
directly to Wormser, Marion Smith saw Luthy as the culmination of a set of decisions that began 
with the Shepaud Voting Trust Cases in 1890 and established “the prevailing doctrine” that “a 
voting trust whereby the beneficial ownership in stock is separated from the voting power is 
contrary to public policy and illegal, except under certain circumstances.”115 The problem, in 
Smith’s view, was to define the “certain circumstances” under which the courts would find a 
voting trust permissible.  Smith made a stab at laying out some basic principles in his article, but 
the effort could not be taken as definitive because Wormser and other scholars disagreed with his 
about the so-called prevailing doctrine.116 
114 Wormser also disapproved of a 1916 decision by the Missouri Public Service Commission that rejected 
a plan to create a voting trust as part of the reorganization of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad. To Wormser’s 
chagrin, the Commission again cited the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases for its finding that such a trust would be 
“against the public policy of this State.” I. Maurice Wormser, “The Legality of Voting Trusts and Pooling 
Agreements,” Columbia Law Review 18.2 (1918): 123-136 at 127, 132. See also Vincent Dougherty and John J. 
Berry Jr., “The Voting Trust—Its Present Status,” Georgetown Law Journal 28 (May 1940): 1121-1128 at 1122. 
Cushing, however, downplayed the effect of the Pujo investigation in Voting Trusts, 26-30. 
115 Marion Smith, “Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,” Columbia Law Review 22 (Nov. 1922), 
627-637 at 630.
116 Smith, “Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,” 630-633. For roughly contemporaneous efforts to 
summarize the state of the law, see “Corporate Voting Trusts—Validity—Banks,” St. John’s Law Review 1 (Dec. 
1926): 65-71; “Corporations—Validity of Voting Trusts,” Southern California Law Review 1 (July 1928): 479-483; 
Robert W. Miller, “Voting Trusts,” Indiana Law Journal 4 (June 1929): 600-607.  See also, Cushing, Voting Trusts, 
Ch. 3. 
Statutory Relief 
With the legal status of voting trusts once again unclear, state legislatures began to amend 
their general incorporation laws to permit shareholders to form irrevocable voting trusts for 
limited periods of time, restoring the device’s utility for legitimate purposes but at the same time 
making it difficult to use them for monopoly control.  Only two states had responded to the first 
wave of judicial concern about voting trusts, and they had taken opposite positions.  In 1901 
New York had come to the rescue of bankers who used voting trusts to reorganize bankrupt 
railroads by amending the state’s general corporation law to permit any stockholder to enter into 
a written agreement to “transfer his stock to any person or persons for the purpose of vesting in 
him or them the right to vote thereon for a time not exceeding five years . . . .”117 California, 
however, had moved in the opposite direction in reaction to its high court’s decision, in Smith v. 
San Francisco & North Pacific Railway Company, to uphold an irrevocable voting trust.118 The 
legislature enacted a “clarifying” statute requiring agreements that delegated the right to vote 
shares to have a specified term of no more than seven years, and more importantly, mandating 
that they must always be revocable at the will of the shareholder.119  
Maryland followed New York’s lead in 1908, but no other state adopted either the New 
York or California model before the Pujo hearings.120  In the wake of the investigation and 
especially the Illinois high court’s ruling in Luthy invalidating irrevocable voting trusts, more 
117 New York Legislature, “An Act to amend … the general corporation law,” approved Apr. 16, 1901. 
New York later extended the term of a voting trust to ten years.  New York Legislature, “An Act to amend the stock 
corporation law, generally,” approved May 24, 1923. 
118 Smith v. San Francisco & North Pacific Railway Co., 115 Cal. 584 (1897). 
119 California Legislature, “An act … relating the giving and use of proxies to vote corporate stock,” 
approved Feb. 27, 1905. For a case invalidating a voting trust on the basis of this act, see Simpson v. Nielson, 77 Cal. 
App. 297 (1926).  
120 Wormser, “Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts,” 125. 
   
and more states adopted a statute like New York’s.121  By 1940, twenty states (including 
California) had enacted legislation legalizing irrevocable voting trusts but restricting their 
duration (usually to ten years), and by 1960 the number had increased to thirty-nine.  The Model 
Business Corporation Act adopted by the American Bar Association in 1950 also included such a 
provision.122  
These statutes made it possible for business people to continue to use voting trusts for 
purposes that had long been regarded as legitimate, for example, inducing lenders to come to the 
aid of corporations in financial difficulty. Thus, when the United States Food Products 
Corporation was reorganized as the National Distillers Products Company in 1924, the bankers 
that underwrote the rescue created voting trusts for both classes of the new enterprise’s shares.123 
Similarly, voting trusts formed a key part of the plan to refinance the Fox Film Corporation and 
the Fox Theatres Corporation in 1930.124 In some case, the courts themselves played an 
important in setting up the trusts. For example, a plan devised to salvage the New York Title and 
Mortgage Company in 1937 proposed that all of the capital stock of the reorganized company 
would be placed in a voting trust, whose trustees would be appointed by a state judge.125  
At the same time as the new statutes preserved voting trusts’ traditional utility, they 
reduced the device’s usefulness for anticompetitive purposes. The requirement that shareholders 
121 The Pujo committee did not recommend a ban of voting trusts.  It did, however, conclude that their use 
in financial institutions was “highly inadvisable and prejudicial” and proposed that Congress prohibit voting trusts in 
national banks. U.S. House of Representatives, “Report of the Committee,” 142.  Congress did not act, but the New 
York legislature amended its general incorporation statute in 1925 to prohibit the use of voting trusts in banks. See 
New York Legislature, “An Act to amend the stock corporation law,” approved Mar. 12, 1925. New York’s high 
court not only upheld the law but applied it retroactively. In re Morse, 247 N.Y. 290 (1928).   
122 Dougherty and Berry, “Voting Trust,” 1124; American Bar Foundation, Model Business Corporation 
Act Annotated (St. Paul, Minn.:  West Publishing Co., 1960), §32, 559-61. The Model Act excluded a sentence, 
written into the New York law from the beginning and copied by ten other states, requiring all shareholders to have 
the right to join voting trust agreements.  California allowed voting trusts to have a duration of 21 years.  California 
Legislature, “An act … relating to corporations,” approved June 12, 1931. 
123 “New Products Co. Lists Its Stock,” New York Times,  Aug. 28 1924, 25. 
124 “Fox Boards Adopt New Financing Plan,” New York Times, 19 Feb. 19, 1930, 22. 
125 “New Plan to Save New York Title Co.,” New York Times, Dec. 3, 1937, 35. 
   
vote regularly to renew the agreements made extending them an uncertain proposition, forcing 
promoters to pass on more of the gains from consolidation if they wanted shareholders to 
continue the trust. At the same time, it was no longer advisable to limit the benefits to those who 
agreed to participate because, given the courts’ changing views, disadvantaged minority 
shareholders were more likely to sue. Indeed, derivative actions soared during the 1930s, as 
revelations of bad business behavior in the run-up to the crash made judges more receptive to 
shareholders who challenged managerial decisions.126 The courts, moreover, seem to have 
strictly enforced both the statutory time limits on voting trusts and the legal procedures for 
renewing the agreements.127   
Despite the changes, reformers continued to rail against the use of voting trusts for 
purposes of monopoly control.  There were no longer many nefarious examples for critics to 
seize upon, however. William O. Douglas, a member of the newly-formed Securities and 
Exchange Commission, declared at a Bankers Club luncheon in 1937 that voting trusts were 
“little more than a vehicle for corporate kidnapping,” but he gave no examples to support his 
allegation.128 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means complained about the use of voting trusts as a 
tool to separate ownership from control, but were able to muster few examples and only one was 
really on point:  a voting trust set up to control the Interborough Rapid Transit Company, which 
included an automatic renewal arrangement of the type that the courts would very soon 
invalidate.129   
126 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, 36-40. 
127 See, for example, Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350 (N.Y. 1934), invalidating a 
voting trust that automatically extended at the end of its term; Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 
33 (1937), invalidating a voting trust whose duration exceeded the statutory limit; Belle Isle Corp. v. Corcoran, 29 
Del. Ch. 554 (1946), invalidating the extension of a voting trust because the vote had occurred several year prior to 
the trust’s expiration and state law required a vote within one year of the expiration. 
128 “End of Banks’ Rule in Industry Hinted,” New York Times, Mar. 24 1937, 37.  
129 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York:  
Macmillan, 1933), 73, 83. 
   
Nor did the massive investigations conducted by the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC) in the late 1930s and early 1940s into “The Concentration of Economic 
Power” uncover much more.  When committee members called the country’s leading investment 
bankers to testify, they found a dramatically different situation from the one the Pujo hearings 
had uncovered a quarter century earlier. Although the investigators interrogated witnesses about 
voting trusts whenever they caught references to them, hardly any came up. The Harrimans had 
created a ten-year voting trust to pool the stock that family members and their associated 
companies held in the private bank of Harriman Ripley & Company, and the committee 
questioned witnesses extensively about those arrangements. It also reproduced documents about 
a deal in which members of the banking house of Ladenburg, Thalmann resigned from voting 
trusts they had organized in a group of Pittsburgh utilities in order to sell their shares in those 
companies.130 But that was all the TNEC managed to come up with. Voting trusts were no longer 
an important tool that bankers or anyone else could use to concentrate economic power. 
Conclusion 
Scholars have long recognized that the states’ power to charter corporations bolstered 
their antitrust initiatives in ways that were not available to the federal government. But they have 
also argued that the growth of large-scale enterprises operating in national and even international 
markets forced states to abandon their efforts out of fear of doing serious damage to their 
domestic economies. Our paper has revised this conventional view by focusing attention on the 
130 There are three volumes of hearings devoted to investment banking. The Harriman voting trust was 
probed in Temporary National Economic Committee, Hearings (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 
1940), Part 22, 11403-25, 11519; and the Ladenburg, Thalmann deal, in Part 24, 12553, 12860-65. Part 23 contains 
no references to voting trusts. 
   
lawsuits that minority shareholders brought against their own companies in state courts of law 
and equity. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs 
and had displayed a particular wariness of shareholders’ derivative suits.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and to see shareholders’ 
private actions as useful checks on economic concentration. Judges’ reconsideration of voting 
trusts was a key part of this transformation.  Initially courts had seen nothing wrong with the 
device. If a majority of shareholders wanted to combine their interests, there was nothing to 
prevent them—so long as they did not exploit their control to oppress minority shareholders. 
However, evidence that the device was being used for anticompetitive purposes, first by 
industrial trusts like Standard Oil and then by J. P. Morgan and the so-called Money Trust, led 
judges to rethink the relationship between shareholders and the corporations in which they 
owned stock, and to see the enforcement of shareholders’ voting rights as a critical tool of public 
policy. When the courts went so far as to outlaw irrevocable voting trusts, however, state 
legislatures stepped in with a compromise, enacting laws that legalized such arrangements but 
only for limited periods of time. These statutes restored the utility of voting trusts for legitimate 
purposes, such as reorganizing companies in financial distress, but reduced the possibility that 
they could be used for the purposes of consolidating economic power. 
Many scholars have noted that finance capitalism declined in the United States at the 
same time as it continued to thrive in other growing second-industrial-revolution economies such 
as Germany.131 We think the history of voting trusts is an important part of the story. We want to 
be careful here not to claim too much. Certainly, other changes helped bring finance capitalism 
to an end. The literature, for example, attributes considerable importance to the Clayton Act’s 
131 See, for example, Jeffrey Fear and Christopher Kobrak, “Banks on Board:  German and American 
Corporate Governance, 1870-1914,” Business History Review 84 (Winter 2010): 703-736. 
prohibition of interlocking directorates, another outcome of the Pujo hearings.132 However, we 
do not want to claim too little either. After all, it was voting trusts that made it possible both for 
industrial combinations to evade the laws regulating mergers and for bankers to ensure their 
presence on corporate boards.  
The literature on the response to large-scale monopolies has focused on developments at 
the national level—and on antitrust policy as conventionally defined—to the exclusion of private 
legal actions and developments in state corporation law and equity jurisprudence. Our study of 
derivative suits and challenges to voting trusts has allowed us to begin to redress this imbalance 
by showing how changes in these areas could matter over the long run—how they could reduce 
the arsenal of weapons that the wealthy and powerful might deploy for anticompetitive purposes.  
These developments may have been “hidden in plain sight,” but they nonetheless played a 
critical role in preserving the competitive structure of the American economy. 
132 Fear and Kobrak, “Banks on Board”; Carola Frydman and Eric Hilt, “Investment Banks as Corporate 
Monitors in the Early Twentieth Century United States,” American Economic Review 107 (July 2017): 1938-1970; 
DeLong, “Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value?” 
